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EC·US  Trade  Grievances 
Aired  in  2-Day  talks 
Sicco L.  Mansholt, Vice President of the 
Commission of the European Communities, 
and Commission member Ralf Dahrendorf, 
spent October 21-22 in Washington discuss-
ing with Administration officials the conse-
quences of President Richard M.  Nixon's 
new  economic  policy  announcement  on 
August 15. 
Some points of agreement but also some 
"differences of perception" emerged from 
the talks which are part of a series of twice 
yearly EC-US exchanges initiated after the 
Kennedy Round of negotiations in the Gen-
eral Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). 
During the inter-agency meetings under the 
chairmanship of Deputy Under Secretary for 
Economic Affairs 1\lathaniel Samuels, the 
Commission representatives met with: Presi-
dent Nixon's Special Foreign Economic Ad-
visor Peter G.  Peterson, Secretary of State 
William P.  Rogers, Secretary of Agriculture 
Clifford M.  Hardin, Under Secretary of Treas-
ury Paul C. Volker, Special Representative 
Designate for Trade Negotiations William 
Eberle, and other Administration officials. 
Accompanying  Mr.  Mansholt  and  Mr. 
Dahrendorf were: Theodorus Hijzen, acting 
director  general  for  trade  policy;  Louis 
Georges Rab:Jt, director general for agricul-
tural affairs; Rena to Ruggiero, chief execu-
tive  assistant  to  Commission  President 
Franco Maria Malfatti; Fernand Braun, dep-
uty director general for industrial affairs; 
and Paul Luyten, foreign trade specialist on 
affairs concerning the General Agreement 
on  Tariffs and Trade (GATT); Sjouke Jonker, 
chief executive assistant to Vice President 
Mansholt; Klaus Terfloth, chief executive 
assistant to Commission Dahrendorf, and 
Paulette Basse res, a member of the Com-
mission's Directorate General for External 
Trade. 
Europe Feels Unjustly Harmed 
At a news conference in Washington on Oc-
tober 22, both Mr. Mansholt and Mr. Dahren-
dorf emphasized the unusually good atmos-
phere in  which the exchange of views had 
taken place. They said they were returning 
to Brussels with "clarity of the American 
view." 
Before the visit, Europe thought the United 
States had put the 10 per cent surcharge on 
imports  to  gain  a  bargaining  position  in 
world  trade.  As  a  result  of  the  talks,  the 
Community understood that the surcharge 
was instituted as a monetary measure, Mr. 
Mansholt said. However, both Mr.  Mansholt 
and Mr. Dahrendorf stressed that while in-
tended as a monetary measure, the US im-
US  Secretary of State William P.  Rogers gave a working reception during the  Common Market officials' visit. 
Top photo, reading clockwise from  the couch tacir;g the camera are: US  Under Secretary of State John N.  Irwin 
II; US  Secretary of Commerce  Maurice  Stans; US  Deputy  Under Secretary of State  tor Economic  Affairs 
Nathaniel Samuels; Common Market Commission President Franco Maria Maltatti's Chief Executive Assistant 
Renata Ruggiero; US  Assistant Secretary of State tor European Affairs Martin J.  Hillenbrand; Aida Maria Mazio, 
chief of the  Common  Market  Delegation  to  the  United States; US  Under Secretary of State  tor Economic 
Affairs Philip H.  Trezise; US Special Trade Representative Designate WJI/iam  Eberle; US  Federal Reserve Board 
Chairman Arthur F.  Burns; President Richard M.  Nixon's Assistant tor International Economic Affairs Peter G. 
Peterson; US  Under Secretary of Treasury tor Monetary Affairs Paul C.  Vo/cker; US  Secretary of State William 
P.  Rogers; Common Market Commissioner Rail Dahrendort; Theodorus Hijzen, acting director of the Common 
Market's  Directorate  General  tor  Trade  Policy,  and  Common  Market  Commission  Vice  President  Sicco  L. 
Mansholt. Bottom  photo,  reading  clockwise from  the  couch  facing  the  camera  are: Mr. Rogers,  Mr. Dahrendort, 
Mr. Mans holt, US  Secretary of Agriculture Clifford M.  Hardin, and Ambassador Robert J.  Schaetze/, chief of the 
US Mission to  the European Communities. 
port surcharge unfairly affected the Com-
munity's trade. In view of its constant trade 
deficit with the United States, the Community 
could hardly be accused of protectionism 
against US goods; it buys more from the 
United States than it sells in the US market. 
Despite the adverse effects of the US 
unilateral action, both Mr.  Mansholt and 
Mr. Dahrendorf agreed that there had been· 
two positive results. 
•  It caused  the  Community members to 
"pull together," and facilitate agreement on 
exchange rate relationships between them-
selves and on  a common position for nego-
tiations with the United States. 
•  It clarified the political situation, focusing 
attention on the underlying causes of long-
standing grievances. 
Nevertheless, agrement with the United 
States on the major issues of monetary re-
form, trade liberalization, and international 
burden sharing will not be easy. First, the 
political elements have to be distinguished 
from the economic elements and negotiated 
separately, Mr.  Mansholt said. Trade ques-
tions also have to be separated from mone-
tary questions, he added. 
US  Understanding 
Questioned about the US $2 billion surplus 
on trade with the Community during a State 
Department briefing also on October 22, 
Mr. Samuels said that the Community was 
"not pressing a bilateral relationship be-
tween Europe and the United States in exclu-
sion to the total global relationship that we 
have to work out ... there are other ele-
ments." He  mentioned long-term  capital 
flows but said "that was not really a matter 
of any substantive discussion between us 
at these sessions."  3 4 
Asked whether the United States would 
stall on removing the import surcharge in 
the hopes of building up its trade balance, 
Mr. Samuels said: "The United States has 
no reason to slow down any settlement of 
these outstanding problems. On the other 
hand, we have no reason .o speed a settle-
ment that would be adequate." 
About the chances for an  international 
readjustment of parities and the Commu-
nity's role in it, Mr. Samuels was cautious. 
He  said  the  Community thought it could 
agree  on  new  relationships  between  the 
values of its members' currencies which, 
from the US point of view could "be either 
good ... or bad." It depends on what actions 
take place after that." 
EC  Issues  Report 
on  US·EC  Trade 
The growth of Japanse exports to the United 
States is not the result of Common Market 
protectionism according to a European Com-
munity report. 
Indeed, a larger percentage of Japanese 
exports went to the United States (30.7 per 
cent) than to the Common Market (6.7 per 
cent) in 1970, but the disparity was due to 
the heavy competition in the European mar-
ket and to natural barriers, such as distance, 
rather than trade barriers, the report said. 
The report, which deals with EC-US com-
mercial relations, was distributed in Wash-
ington on October 21  on the first day of talks 
between Community leaders and US Admin-
istration officials on  major trade and eco-
nomic issues (see page 3 ). 
Japanese and Community firms concen-
trate in  many of  the same industries and 
products,  such  as  consumer electronics, 
small automobiles and textiles. With such 
heavy competition, domestic firms maintain 
the competitive edge by promising quick 
delivery and better service and maintenance, 
according to the Community review. For ex-
ample, only Italy limits the entry of Japanese 
automobile imports to the Community. De-
spite unrestricted entry into the other five 
member countries, Japan exports only $30 
million to $40 million in cars to the Commu-
nity compared to more than one-half billion 
to  the United States. 
Some quantitative restrictions by Commu-
nity member countries against Japanese 
products still exist just as  they  do in the 
United States, the review stated. However, 
it also stressed that the Community is cur-
rently negotiating a treaty with Japan de-
signed to reduce on a reciprocal basis 75 
per cent of the existing quantitative restric-
tions. 
Six  Agree  to  Limit 
Regional  Aid  Race 
To stop outbidding on regional investment 
aids, the European Community countries 
have agreed to set a 20 per cent ceiling on 
the amount of aid a member government 
may contribute to any one investment. 
This agreement was reached in Luxem-
bourg on October 20 at a meeting of the 
Council of Ministers, the first devoted ex-
clusively to regional policy. 
Discouraging Congestion 
Stated in a resolution, the new policy on 
aids to regional investments is intended to 
•  discourage aids to the congested "cen-
tral" areas so that the less-favored regions 
can  benefit 
•  end the "overbidding" whereby govern-
ments compete with each other for foreign 
investments. 
It goes into effect on January 1, 1972, for 
an initial trial period of one year. The Com-
mission will supervise the system which will 
be reevaluated jointly with the member 
states. The governments will also rearrange 
their. aids during 1972 to make them "trans-
parent" (i.e., so that their nature can be 
clearly seen and their extent clearly calcu-
lated). Aid will be given only to areas in 
Albert Borschette {left), Commissioner member re-
sponsible lor regional policy, and Belgian Vice Prime 
Minister and Minister of the Budget Andre Cools chat 
during a pause in  the mAeUng of the Council of Min-
isters  on  regional policy. 
genuine need and it will be designed to meet 
those needs. After the Community's enlarge-
ment, the present classification of central 
areas would be revised. 
Initial  Discussion 
The Council also began discussion on three 
other Commission proposals for 
•  the creation of a standing committee for 
regional development, bringing together 
governmental and Commission experts to 
review regional policy needs. 
•  the establishment of a special interest re-
bate fund. This fund, consisting of $50 mil-
lion a year initially, would subsidize by up 
to three percentage points loans by the 
European Investment Bank and other finan-
cial institutions for investments in develop-
ment regions. The first $50 million would go 
to priority agricultural areas, since in the 
present Community this is where the worst 
regional problems are found. 
•  the allocation of $50 million a year from 
the European Agricultural Fund to attract 
industry into poor rural areas. Premiums of 
$1,500 would be offered for each new job 
created for farmers, farm-workers, or their 
children. 
The proposals (the first two are based on 
the Commission's 1969 memorandum) have 
been approved by the European Parliament, 
the Economic and Social Committee, and 
the Community's Medium-Term Economic 
Policy Committee. 
Institutional Difference 
During the Council meeting, the Commis-
sion, Italy, and Germany tried to get a formal 
agreement in principle on the three pro-
posals. Belgium, the Netherlands and Lux-
embourg expressed reservations. 
France showed great interest and seemed 
prepared to provide funds at a later stage, 
but preferred an  intergovernmental to a 
Community framework. Thus, France sug-
gested that the Standing Committee be 
composed of senior civil servants from na-
tional administrations, empowered to make 
proposals directly to the Council. (France 
has made a similar suggestion on joint con-
trol of drug trafficking and abuse; the insti-
tutional aspect is also partly responsible for 
the delays in agreeing on a Community 
industrial policy.) 
Backed in particular by Italy and Ger-
many, the Commission resisted the French 
approach, which would deprive the Commis-
sion of its right of initiative. 
The Ministers agreed that additional funds 
would be needed, but Germany opposed 
subsidized interest rates because it could 
distort the operations of capital markets. 
Germany suggested straight premiums on 
approved investments, and thought the farm 
fund's current ceiling of $285 million a year 
on structural reforms should be maintained. 
Germany thought the new funds should 
become available during the second stage 
of the plan for economic and monetary 
union. Italy suggested January 1, 1973, and 
France said the issue could be left to the 
proposed committee. Transport  Ministers 
to  set  Priornes 
Common rules for cross-frontier passenger 
transport will soon be applied throughout the 
European Community following decisions 
by the Council of Ministers at a meeting in 
Luxembourg on October 12. Revised rules 
on maximum driving time for short distance 
road transport will also soon go into effect. 
During the meeting, Albert Coppe, Com-
mission member responsible for transport 
policy had criticized the transport ministers' 
attitude of "benign neglect." 
Conflicts in national policies not only ad-
versely affected competition but also ham-
pered full integration, since the transport 
sector is an important connective in an  in-
terdependent Community, he observed. 
Despite these difficulties, the Ministers 
are expected to revive the common transport 
policy at the next Council session which is 
scheduled to take place in early December. 
At the end of the meeting, Mr. Coppe, speak-
ing for the Commission, said a list of priori-
ties and a timetable would be made and 
submitted to the Council. 
Trend Toward Simplification 
As part of the program to introduce common 
rules for cross-frontier road transport of 
passengers, the Council agreed on two regu-
lations. One deals with regular bus service 
for tourists and specialized regular bus 
services across member states' borders. 
The regulations provide for a uniform 
licensing system valid for the entire journey. 
Member states where passengers get on and 
off will fix the details of regular services, but 
transit states will be entitled to intervene, 
under a Community procedure. Conditions 
of shuttle services will be set by the mem-
ber states from which the bus leaves. Here, 
too, the country of destination and transit 
countries will have a chance to appeal 
against the conditions. The regulations are 
intended to simplify the operation of these 
services and enable a coach to take passen-
gers from Paris to Bonn, for example, and 
pick up another group to take back to 
France. 
Driving Times Modified 
Ministers also agreed to modify the regula-
tions on maximum driving times for short-
distance road transport (up to 50 kilome-
ters). As suggested by firms operating 
delivery services, breaks for loading and 
unloading will be excluded from the defini-
tion of driving time. The maximum driving 
time remains eight hours, followed by one 
hour's rest. 
Checks on driving times will be simplified. 
Short-distance drivers will no longer be 
School bus stop in  Brides, France. One  of the  regula-
tions passed by the Council sets a common rules tor 
licensing school buses. PHOTO: French Embassy 
Press and Information Division, New York 
compelled to keep a log book. They may in-
stall a tachygraph or any other simplified 
method of control, approved by the national 
authorities and by the Commission. 
Even more flexible rules are planned for 
vehicles used in harvesting. The Ministers 
agreed informally (a formal decision must 
await the opinions of the European Parlia-
ment and the Economic and Social Commit-
tee) that the eight-hour maximum could be 
extended by one hour for transport from or 
to a point outside the Community. The Euro-
pean Road Transport Agreement prescribes 
a nine-hour maximum. This would only need 
to be a temporary concession, as ERTA 
signatories have resolved to introduce eight-
hour shifts in two years' time. 
Compromise Nears on Truck Weights 
While the Council failed to agree on com-
mon rules for the maximum weight and size 
of trucks, there were signs of an approach-
ing compromise. Like many other highly 
technical features of the Common Market, 
the issue is of major economic importance, 
in this case, because the vehicle industries 
of France, Germany, Italy, and the Nether-
lands are directly affected. 
At present, France, Belgium, and Luxem-
bourg authorize a maximum load of 13 
metric tons per axle, but Belgium plans to 
switch to 10 tons, while Germany, Italy, and 
the Netherlands set a 1  0-ton limit. Thus, the 
driver of a French truck could have to un-
load some of his goods when crossing the 
border into Germany. The closely integrated 
Benelux area is particularly affected by the 
disparate laws. 
The Commission suggested a compromise 
suitable for container-transport-an 11.5 
ton per axle limit by 1974. Maximum weight 
would be 42 tons, length 18 meters, width 
2.5 meters, height 4 meters, and power 8 
horsepower a ton. 
Until now, the two main protagonists re-
mained adamant. Germany said the giant 
trucks caused extra pollution, congestion, 
and wear and tear on roads. Germany also 
wants to shift more freight on to their rail-
roads to help reduce operating deficits and 
ease road congestion. France maintained 
that large loads were more economical. At 
the same time the French heavy vehicle in-
dustry stressed that it was not properly 
equipped to produce smaller trucks, so that 
it would not be able to compete if the French 
law were changed. The indications are that 
France will agree to a lower limit, but only 
if the effective date is delayed long enough 
to allow French manufacturers to alter their 
assembly lines, beyond 1974. In their search 
for a compromise, the Six will consult Brit-
ain and the other applicants. 
Market Access and  Rates 
On the organization of the transport market 
(e.g., access to the market and introduction 
of rate systems), Italy, Luxembourg and the 
Netherlands agreed broadly with the Com-
mission's proposals. Germany thought the 
Community's transport network was working 
satisfactorily, despite the deficiencies noted 
by the Commission. Bonn would like the Six 
to give priority to harmonizing social aspects 
and conditions of competition. France, too, 
stressed the need for more equal conditions 
of competition. Paris thought it preferable 
to let member states settle transport policy 
details, unless the lack of Community regu-
lations hampered cross-frontier transport. 
France and Germany also attached spe-
cial importance to the Commission's pro-
posals that transport users pay for use of 
infrastructures (roads, bridges, etc.). This 
would help to equalize conditions of compe-
tition: the road transporter pays no direct 
charge for using roads (except the tolls for 
French and Italian motorways) while the 
railroads are expected to cover running and 
capital costs out of their passenger and 
freight revenue. However, little progress 
was made towards agreement on this issue.  5 6 
council  Gives  Go-ahead 
tor  New  social  Fund 
The new-style European Social Fund will 
become operative January 1,  1972 as a 
result of decisions made by the Council of 
Ministers in Luxembourg on October 19. 
The Fund will help to retrain workers, re-
settle them and their families, provide un-
employment allowances, and inform workers 
of job openings. Like the old Fund it re-
places, it will allocate its resources mainly 
in the Community's development regions, 
where the worst unemployment and under-
employment problems exist. Both its re-
sources and its activities will be consider-
ably extended. The Commission should have 
$50 million at its disposal during 1972, but 
hopes that the figure will increase to $250-
300 million per year in two or three years. 
Instead of acting as a relatively passive 
and inflexible "clearing house," financing 
half the cost of retraining and redeploy-
ment programs initiated by the member 
governments, as happened in the past, the 
reformed Fund will play a more active role 
in retraining workers threatened with re-
dundancy before their existing jobs actually 
disappear. From September 1960 to Decem-
ber 1970, over $307 million had been spent, 
half contributed by the Social Fund and half 
by the government concerned, on  retraining 
1,301,100 workers. 
Two Kinds of Activities 
The Fund will be able to act in two separate 
ways: 
•  It will help workers whose jobs may be 
threatened as a direct result of continuing 
integration in the Community. It will cover 
the cost of retraining, in some circum-
stances, income support during retraining, 
and also resettlement where necessary. The 
precise arrangements will be decided on an 
ad hoc basis by the Council. 
•  It will also, jointly with the government 
concerned, pay for retraining and resettle-
ment in areas of structural unemployment 
not resulting directly from the Community's 
existence. The latter are at present found 
mainly in poorer areas, particularly in 
Southern Italy. 
For the first five years of its operation, up 
to 50 per cent of the new Fund's resources 
will be spent on this second type of help. 
The principle of an  incomes guarantee un-
der this second section has been approved, 
though this part of the plan will not come 
into operation immediately. The Council also 
agreed that the two sides of industry will in 
the future be closely associated with the 
running of the Fund. 
The general lines of the new Fund were 
accepted by the Council in July 1970. The 
Council on October 19,1971, adopted the 
detailed implementing regulations so that 
the Fund can come into operation on Janu-
ary 1,  1972. 
Non-profitmaking organizations will be 
eligible for aid, but all requests to the Com-
mission must come from member states. 
The Commission can use some of the Fund's 
resources to carry out pilot projects. It will 
act in liaison with the Social Fund Commit-
tee and the Standing Committee on Em-
ployment. 
Six want More concrete Jobs Policy 
The Six are preparing to cooperate more 
closely in  maintaining full employment and 
improving working conditions in  industry. 
As economic integration advances,  cor-
responding  progress must be  made  in  the 
social  and  labor field.  The  members of the 
European Communities have  therefore de-
cided that cooperation should extend be-
yond studies into active concentration of 
social policies and  legislation. 
New Program 
A new program has been drawn up,  super-
seding the one passed in June 1967. It calls 
for priority action in these sectors: 
•  employment, free movement of workers, 
training and career guidance. Improvements 
will  be  sought in  methods of forecasting 
the  size  of the  labor  force;  employment 
agencies; working conditions of office work-
ers,  young workers and  migrants from non-
member countries; and training of young 
and unskilled workers. 
•  health  care  and  welfare.  The  Six will 
step up work on  a Community-level social 
budget, and on  various financial  aspects of 
welfare,  e.g.,  the  cost  of  building  and 
running hospitals, and the provision of social 
security to farmers. 
•  industrial  safety.  Experts  will focus on 
joint efforts to curb accidents and  noise in 
factories. Projects to help building workers 
and  workers using  compressed  air have 
been specified. 
Member states plan to  intensify efforts 
to improve job training in the Community. 
The aim is to coordinate efforts on: 
•  labor problems which affect all  member 
countries and  where  Community-level ac-
tion is especially suitable 
•  helping workers in technologically ad-
vanced  industries to  learn new techniques, 
and  retraining workers in  depression areas, 
especially low-income farming  regions. 
Berthoin Heads 
London  EC  Delegation 
Georges Berthoin has been accredited as 
the new head of the European Communities' 
delegation in London, the Commission of the 
European Communities announced on Oc-
tober 19. 
Mr.  Berthoin, who worked with former 
French Prime Minister Robert Schuman and 
was chief executive assistant to Jean Man-
net at the European Coal and Steel Commu-
nity in 1952-54, has been closely associated 
with the development of UK-EC relations 
since 1956. He succeeds Johannes Linthorst-
Homan who has retired as head of the 
mission. 
Dr. Mazio 
10  Head 
EC 
Delegation 
A/do Maria Mazio, the head of the first 
permanent Common Market delegation to 
the United States assumed his duties Octo-
ber 20.  Dr. Mazio handed his credentials 
(a letter of introduction from Rail Dahren-
dorf, Common Market Commissioner in 
charge of external relations) to US Secretary 
of State William P.  Rogers. 
The delegation was created to strengthen 
US-European Community ties. The Commu-
nity had maintained an information office in 
Washington since 1954 and a " liaison office" 
since 1967. 
Dr.  Mazio, previously Ambassador of Italy 
to Belgium, has severed his connection with 
the Italian diplomatic service to represent 
the Commission of the European Communi-
ties in Washington. 
After graduation from the Law School of 
the University of Rome, Dr.  Mazio studied at 
the Yale University Graduate School of 
Political Science. He entered the Italian 
diplomatic service in 1932 and served as 
first secretary at the Italian Emb'assy in 
Washington and later as consul general in 
New York. He was subsequently appointed 
ambassador to Dublin, Tunis, The Hague, 
and, in  1965, Brussels. 
Mr.  Mazio is married to  Augusta Cantu, 
the daughter of Admiral Giuseppe  Cantu 
who was  Italian Commissioner at the New 
York World's  Fair in  1939. They have 
three children. Mallatti Outlines 
Goals ol summit Meeting 
An  overall strategy to tackle the problems 
raised  by US  attempts to defend the dollar 
should be mapped out at a ten-nation Euro-
pean  summit meeting in  1972, according 
to Common Market Commission President 
Franco Maria Malfatti. 
Addressing the  European  Parliament in 
Strasbourg  on  October 21,  Mr.  Malfatti 
suggested that this conference would bridge 
the  gap  between  the  signature  of the en-
largement Treaties by the United Kingdom, 
Ireland,  Norway, and  Denmark and  their 
entry into force.  Decisions must be  made 
during the meeting, he  said, for strengthen-
ing  the  Community,  for accelerating  the 
achievement of full  economic and  mone-
tary  union,  and  for  presenting  a  common 
stand in negotiations with the  United States 
to  settle the  current monetary  and  trade 
difficulties. 
Other objectives of the meeting would be: 
•  a  redistribution  of  the  cost  burden  of 
European defense, possibly at a European 
Security Conference 
•  definition of the  political and  economic 
role  that a ten-nation  Community should 
play in the world. 
world Trade &rows 8.5% 
World trade last year remained  surprisingly 
buoyant,  but price increases outstripped 
volume growth, according to the annual  re-
port on  development in  international trade 
by the General Agreement on  Tariffs and 
Trade (GATT). 
International Trade  1970  said  the  main 
trade trends in 1970 were: 
•  the continued  rapid growth (more than 
14  per cent)  in  the value of world exports, 
despite relatively slow growth in the gross 
national product of the main trading nations 
•  a  slowdown  in  the  growth  rate  of the 
volume of exports (8.5 per cent compared 
with 10 per cent in 1969) 
•  a more rapid growth-for the first time-
in  the volume of trade in agricultural prod-
ucts and minerals than of trade in manufac-
tured products 
•  slower growth than usual in trade under 
preferential  agreements  (intra-EEC  and 
intra-EFT  A trade were both up by about 19 
per cent) 
•  a deterioration in the terms of trade of 
developing countries, reversing the improve-
ment of 1969 
•  an  overall increase in the trade surplus 
of  industrial  areas. 
EDF  Dive $30 Million in Development Aid 
Ten new allocations to Africa from the Euro-
pean Development Fund were announced by 
the Commission of the European Communi-
ties on October 1 and 7, 1971, in Brussels. 
The allocations, amounting to a total of 
$30,320,000, were as follows: 
•  Mali. $522,000 to raise rice production 
near Sikasso. 
•  Senegal. $6,482,000 to continue construc-
tion of the Ziguinchor-Kolda highway and to 
asphalt the entire stretch. 
•  Somali Republic. $763,000  to  build a 
bridge and  road to connect the village of 
Giamana on the Giuba river with the Chisia-
maio-Camsuma-Gelib highway. This road 
will improve the transportation of agricul-
tural products. 
•  Ivory Coast. $522,000 to finance the first 
part of a government plan to increase rice 
production in the ill-favored savanna regions 
of the North and the Center. It is hoped that 
by 1976, local production will cover 85 to 90 
per cent of estimated national consumption. 
•  Togo. $2,675,000 to help cotton produc-
tion in the Central and Plateau regions. Two-
thirds of the population lives in this area. 
•  Rwanda. $950,000 to build a bridge over 
the  Nyabarongo  river  on  the  Gitamara-
Ruhengeri highway. This bridge will mplace 
the existing one which is flooded periodi-
cally because the water level has risen by 9 
feet since 1945. 
•  Congo Republic. $15,960,000 to build and 
asphalt Kenge-Kikwit highway. This road will 
open up the densely populated, rich, agri-
cultural region of Kwilu. 
•  West Africa. $108,000 was given in tech-
nical assistance by sending three Commu-
nity officials to help with preparatory work 
on the Economic Community of West Africa. 
This customs union will include Senegal, 
Mauritania, Upper Volta, Niger, Dahomey, 
and  the  Ivory Coast. 
•  Niger. $2,038,000 to finish the construc-
tion of 16 rural health centers, and $724,000 
to finish 80 storage facilities for agricultural 
products. These additional grants were nec-
essary because of rising material costs. 
•  Mauritania. $300,000 as a special grant to 
help the Mauritanian Government control the 
cholera epidemic which broke out last June. 
German-American soap Accord Under Review 
. An American company and a German firm 
have submitted a proposal for joint research 
and development to the European Commu-
nity Commission to determine whether their 
plans comply with Common Market anti-
trust laws, it was announced in Brussels on 
October 12. 
Colgate Palmolive of New York and Hen-
kel  of Dusseldorf,  West Germany seek to 
cooperate in the research and development 
of laundry soaps and detergents. They plan 
to establish in Switzerland a joint research 
company which, after reviewing and synthe-
sizing past research, will continue to develop 
commercially marketable products. 
Their proposal  appeared to  receive a 
favorable response from the Commission, 
although official action cannot be taken until 
interested third parties have had an  oppor-
tunity to express their views on the proposed 
agreement.  If  approved,  the  agreement 
would make the results of the research, in-
cluding patents and technical know-how, 
equally available to both partners. 
The  Common  Market Treaty prohibits 
agreements  between  enterprises  which 
would prevent, restrict, or distort competi-
tion in the Community and lists specific ex-
amples of prohibited agreements. When an 
agreement is likely to improve the produc-
tion or distribution of goods or promote tech-
nical and economic progress, however, it 
may be exempted from the prohibitions laid 
down by the Treaty. 
Other cooperation agreements which have 
received tentative Commission approval un-
til  third  parties' comments are  received 
include: 
•  a  reciprocal supply and  specialization 
agreement in the field of servo-control sys-
tems concluded between the Paris company 
"Societe d'Optique, Precision Electronique 
and Mecanique" (SOPELEM) and "Aingen 
und Co." in Duesseldorf, West Germany. 
•  An agreement on sales abroad of canned 
vegetables manufactured by five companies 
in Northern France grouped together under 
the name "Societe Anonyme de Fabricants 
de Conserves Alimentaires," (SAFCO) at La 
Gorgue, France. 
•  a cooperation and rationalization agree-
ment between the "Wild Paris" Company of 
Rueii-Malmaison and "E. Leitz-France" of 
Kremlin-Bicetre, France, for the marketing 
of optical microscopes and their accessories 
manufactured  by  their respective  parent 
companies.  7 8 
EIB  Makes Pipeline Loan 
A pipeline 275 miles long, connecting three 
member countries of the European Commu-
nity, will be financed with a loan by the Euro-
pean Investment Bank. 
The loan was concludej on  October 7, 
1971  with Aethylen-Rohrleitungs GmbH & Co 
KG in Marl, Germany, amounting to $4.9 
million for a period of 10 years at 8.5 per cent 
a year. The loan will help finance an ethylene 
pipeline connecting several petrochemical 
plants located in Germany, the Netherlands, 
and Belgium. The pipeline, to be equipped 
with pumping stations, will be able to carry 
up to a million metric tons of ethylene an-
nually. Total investment in the project will 
amount to $43.3 million. 
common Market tor seeds 
A  regulation establishing a common organi-
zation of the European Community's seed 
market will come into effect on  May 1 next 
year and be applied as of July 1,  1972. 
The common rules cover dry husked vege-
tables, hybrid corn, oil seeds and fruit, and 
other seeds for sowing. To help Commu-
nity  farmers,  the  regulation  provides  for 
production grants in the form of a lump sum 
per quintal of seeds produced. 
The regulation establishes a single system 
of  trade  at  the  Community frontier,  with 
the  application  of  the  common  customs 
tariff as the only measure of protection for 
the  above  mentioned  seeds  excluding 
hybrid corn, for which there will be a sys-
tem  of  reference prices with  compensating 
charges. Member governments will also be 
expected  to  harmonize  aid  granted  to 
producers. 
ClOser Ties Foreseen 
With Latin America 
The establishment of official links and close 
economic cooperation were the main topics 
of discussion during Common Market Com-
missioner  Ralf  Dahrendorf's  official  visit 
to four Latin American countries from  Sep-
tember 24 to October 7. 
Mr.  Dahrendorf, who is  responsible for 
external  trade,  visited  Brazil,  Argentina. 
Chile,  and  Peru.  Bad  weather forced  Mr. 
Dahrendorf  to  cancel  plans  to  stop  in 
Uruguay. He  also met with officials of the 
Andean  Group  (Bolivia,  Chile,  Ecuador, 
Colombia, and  Peru)  which is seeking tech-
nical  aid  from  the  European  Community. 
The  Common  Market  concluded  a  non-
preferential commercial pact with Argentina 
on June 30 and is negotiating similar agree-
ments with Brazil and Uruguay. 
Aid Responsibilities Acknowledged 
In  his talks with national and Andean Group 
officials, Mr.  Dahrendorf stressed the grow-
ing importance of the Community's relations 
with Latin America. He also emphasized the 
Community's awareness of  its  responsibili-
ties towards the developing world, particu-
larly in view of the impact the  US  economic 
measures would have on young industries 
in the third world. 
The  Community's system  of generalized 
preferences was widely acclaimed during 
Mr.  Dahrendorf's visit. On July 1, the Com-
munity had  become the first trade  power to 
extend  generalized tariff preferences  on 
its imports from  developing countries. The 
developing  countries  themselves  within 
the  United  Nations Conference  on  Trade 
and Development had asked for such a plan. 
commission  to  Negotiate 
Nuclear  Checks  Accord 
The Six have ended a two-year deadlock 
over outside inspection of the civilian nu-
clear installations in the European Atomic 
Energy Community (Euratom). 
On  September 16, the Council of Ministers 
authorized the Commission to negotiate an 
agreement with the Vienna-based Interna-
tional Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) where-
by  the  Agency  will  recognize  Euratom's 
control and inspection system. It was on this 
condition that all Community member states 
except France agreed to ratify the treaty 
banning the spread of nuclear weapons. 
Malia  Asks  lor  Revisions 
Malta has told the European Community that 
it urgently wants to revise its agreement 
with the Community. 
Malta has requested: 
•  financial and technical help for its indus-
trialization plans 
•  inclusion in the list of 91  countries bene-
fitting from the Community's generalized 
tariff preferences 
•  tariff cuts for some of its farm products 
(especially flowers, fruits and vegetables). 
The Community's agreement with Malta 
went into force in July 1971  and expires on 
March 31, 1976. Under the accord, the Com-
munity is reducing the common external 
tariff by 70 per cent on Malta's exports of 
manufactured goods; textiles remain subject 
to a quota. 
The new Maltese Government has pointed 
out that Malta has barely begun to indus-
trialize its economy and that the agreement 
makes no provisions for exports of farm 
products. 
The  Month  in  Briel 
OCTOBER  1971 
7  Commissioner Ralph Dahrendorf ended 
a 13-day visit to Brazil, Argentina, Chile and 
Peru (see column one). 
5  Addeke Boerma,  Director General of the 
Food and Agricultural Organization, visited 
Brussels to discuss Community cooperation 
on aid to developing countries. 
12  The Council of Transport Ministers met 
in Luxembourg and decided to set priorities 
to speed up the development of the common 
transport policy (see page 5). 
12-13  Membership negotiations continued 
with the United Kingdom. 
15  Membership negotiations continued with 
Ireland and Denmark. 
14  Sangoule Lamizona, President of Upper 
Volta, visited the Commission in Brussels to 
discuss European Development Funds plans 
and achievements and praised the African 
Association. 
18  The European Community Council of 
Ministers met in Luxembourg. 
18-22  The  European  Parliament  met in 
Strasbourg to discuss the Community's draft 
1972 budget and other proposals (see 
page?). 
19  0. Vazquez Carrizosa, Foreign Minister 
of Colombia, visited  Commissioner Ralph 
Dahrendorf in Brussels to discuss develop-
ment of an  institutional framework for 
Community-Andean Group cooperation and 
investments in his own country's economy. 
20  Aldo Maria Mazio became the head of 
the new Community Delegation in Washing-
ton (see page6). 
21-22  Ralph  Dahrendorf,  Commissioner 
member in  charge of foreign  trade,  and 
Commissioner Vice President Sicco L. Man-
shalt in charge of agriculture were in Wash-
ington to meet with Nathaniel Samuels, Dep-
uty Under Secretary for Economic Affairs of 
the U.S. Department of State and U.S. Secre-
tary of Agriculture Clifford M.  Hardin (see 
page 3). 
25-26  The Council of Agricultural Ministers 
met in Luxembourg. 
27-28  The quarterly meeting of the Council 
of Finance Ministers was held, in Paris. 
28  Commissioner Jean-Frangois Deniau 
visited in Togo, where he signed two aid pro-
grams (for hydraulic energy and cotton pro-
duction). 
28  The House of Commons voted 356 to 244 
for the United Kingdom's entry into the Euro-
pean Community. World Trade and Finance Linked 
RALF DAHRENDORF 
President Richard M.  Nixon's actions under his new eco-
nomic program (NEP) shocked Europe. 
The introduction of a 10  per cent import surcharge is 
aimost without precedent in  the  recent  history of world 
trade. In conjunction with the other measures announced at 
the same time, such as the proposed investment tax credit 
on purchases of American machinery and the proposal to 
give tax relief to Domestic International Sales Corporations 
(DISC)  to stimulate exports, the surcharge places some 
imports at a 25 per cent disadvantage. The results of NEP 
cannot yet be measured, but it affects 87 per cent of the 
European Community's exports to the United States, $5.8 
billion-worth of goods. These are large stakes. 
The immediate effects, however, are only one side of 
the coin. Considerable shifts in trade could also occur as 
a result not only of current monetary difficulties but also 
from general  uncertainty about the future shape of the 
American market. 
President Nixon's surprising announcement, the imposi-
tion of the surcharge, the submittal of draft bills for the 
other measures, and the fact that these moves were not 
preceded by consultations have combined to make August 
15, 1971, an historic date in  world currency and trade re-
lationships. New implications are being discovered daily. 
Even after the annual meeting of the International Monetary 
Fund, solutions seem no nearer than after the earlier con-
sultations among the Six and in the Group of Ten. 
Apart from its importance to the United States itself, the 
new US  economic policy will adversely affect the struc-
ture of international economic relations. Nevertheless, the 
Community can understand a policy of drastic or painful 
measures. Many Europeans fully realize the gravity of US 
economic problems. History shows that the Free World's 
progress is  linked to  US  prosperity and  stability.  Euro-
peans also know that the US balance-of-payments problem 
goes beyond monetary and trade policies. Demands for a 
fair sharing of the defense burden can be heard with in-
creasing frequency on the European side of the Atlantic, 
too. 
Through Factual Discussion, Clarity 
Only factual discussion will help us out of the present situa-
tion. Thus, immediately after President Nixon's announce-
ment, the Community pointed out that the source of the 
trouble did not reside in  the US  trade balance. On  trade 
with the Community, the United States is running a sizeable 
surplus, and there can be no question of unfair trade prac-
tices by the Community. Because any escalation of protec-
tionism would be extremely dangerous in this situation, 
the Community has refrained from retaliating but reserves 
its right to do so until the situation is clarified. 
Nevertheless, the Community insists on the removal of 
the discriminatory import surcharge and in this demand 
does not stand  alone. The working party formed  by the 
Council of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT) right after the Nixon announcement has held that 
Mr. Dahrendorf is responsible for trade on the European Communi-
ties Commission. 
the import tax is not only incompatible with the rules of the 
GATT but also inappropriate for the purpose of alleviating 
the US balance-of-payments deficit and that it puts a heavy 
load on US trading partners. 
Developing countries in the Council of the United Na-
tions Conference on  Trade and Development (UNCT  AD) 
have expressed  fears  that the  generalized  preferences 
plan seems jeopardized by the import surcharge which is 
its antithesis. It would be  too bad  if the countries towards 
which  Europe  had  the  greatest  political  responsibility 
were the major victims of a situation which they did the 
least to bring about. 
More than a short-term solution must be found. There 
must be a global settlement covering both world finance 
and world trade. This crisis has shown that world trade 
and world monetary questions can  no  longer be  treated 
separately. 
The European Community will do its share to put its 
relations with the United States on  sound footing  in  the 
long-term. 
Commissioner Raif Dahrendort (foreground lett) was entertained at a reception 
given by US  Secretary of State Wiifiam P.  Rogers {foreground right} during his 
October visit to  Washington (story page 3).  In the background are (lett) Commis-
sioner Vice President Sicco L.  Mansholt, responsible tor the Community's agri-
cultural policy, and US Secretary of Agriculture Clifford M.  Hardin. 
9 From Dependence to Partnership 
RICHARD DUNN 
Between 1919 and 1945, the United States moved from 
isolationism to total involvement in European affairs. The 
US withdrawal in 1919 had proven disastrous. In 1945 the 
security, strength, and  unity of Europe was therefore seen 
as a vital American interest. 
As the greatest power in the world, the United States 
assumed formidable new world responsibilities. When the 
" Iron Curtain" came down, threatening a third world war, it 
confirmed American involvement in  Europe indefinitely. 
The first concrete expression of this attitude was Mar-
shall Aid, which was a plan of unprecedented generosity to 
provide large-scale financial and material assistance to 
the European nations that had been engaged in the war. 
To this offer, however, the Americans attached a rider that 
was  an  important indication of their postwar policy for 
Europe: the  initiative for allocating aid  must come from 
Europe  by  means  of agreement  among  the  individual 
nations. 
It was a plan, not for the recovery of France, Germany, 
Britain, Italy, or other isolated nations but rather for the 
recovery of the European continent. Recovery was closely 
associated with the idea of integration; however, an amend-
ment to the legislation in the Congress, stating that it was 
US  policy to encourage the political integration of Europe, 
was held to be premature and failed to obtain a majority. 
Under the Marshall Plan, recovery did not proceed at the 
same  pace in  every country, but all  beneficiaries made 
rapid  progress.  Partly because  of the  Korean  War,  the 
slump which, under the classical theory might well have 
followed the postwar boom, proved to be little more than a 
slight slackening of growth. 
US Encouraged Economic Unification 
If the first aim of the Marshall Plan was to rescue Europe 
from bankruptcy, its second aim was economic unification. 
Paul  G.  Hoffman,  US  administrator of the  Plan,  urged 
Europe to form a single, large market by dismantling tariff 
barriers and eliminating restrictions on non-frontier pay-
ments. 
US support for the Schuman Plan of 1950 was immediate 
and firm. President Harry S. Truman described the Plan to 
pool Europe's coal and steel resources under a suprana-
tional authority as an  act of "constructive statesmanship." 
The US Congress agreed. Some commentators, even at 
that early date, saw that the Plan could create an economic 
power vying with that of the United States itself. However, 
America chose to  foster unification to  benefit from  the 
existence of a prosperous trading partner and from the sup-
port of a political ally of world strength. Communist pene-
tration in  Eastern Europe and China, and later in Korea, 
confirmed the wisdom of that choice. 
The Joint Defense Effort 
The North Atlantic Treaty, signed on April 4,  1949, was a 
mutual security pact between western Europe and  North 
America. However, one western European country which 
was staging a remarkable economic recovery, was con-
10  Richard Dunn is a former Commission official. 
spicuously absent: Germany. Bringing Germany in  NATO 
would have meant rearming yesterday's bitterest enemy. 
The solution seemed to lie in a European Defense Com-
munity, a project to establish a joint European army under 
a unified command, including the indispensable German 
units. Had  it materialized, it would have contributed both 
to the security of western Europe and to European integra-
tion. As events unfolded, after the French parliament had 
rejected the EDC, Germany, under American sponsorship, 
became a full member of NATO in May 1955, and thus got 
an army anyway. US direct pressure during the EDC debate 
contrasted with America's discreet and cautious role when 
the Six had formed the European Coal and Steel Commu-
nity. President Dwight D.  Eisenhower's Secretary of State, 
John Foster Dulles, declared that failure to ratify the EDC 
would force the United States into an  "agonizing reap-
praisal" of basic foreign policy. However, the " reappraisal" 
that followed in no way affected the general conviction in 
Washington  that the  Europ_ean  economic, political, and 
military integration was good for Europe, and for the 
United States. 
Growing Role for Economic Considerations 
Thus, the European Economic Community and the Euro-
pean Atomic Energy Community, created in  1958,  enjoyed 
US  backing from the outset. Eisenhower was especially 
eager to help  Euratom  in  the  field  of peaceful  uses  of 
atomic energy. 
The Eisenhower Administration for a time favored not 
only an  inner European  Common  Market, but also a free 
trade  area  of outer European  countries,  which  would 
trade tariff-free with the  Six, but apply their own  tariffs 
(not the Common Market's) in  trade with the rest of the 
world. This view marked a change from earlier US attitudes 
Even after the post-war recovery and the formation of the Common Market, the 
members of the European Community have imported more from the United States 
than the United States has imported from them. The Community's deficit on 
trade with the United Sta tes has averaged nearly $2 billion a year since 1958. EC-US  TRADE  (1953-70) (inbillionsofdollars) 
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and  showed  that  the  United  States  would  accept  trade 
sacrifices, in  the  hopes of offsetting them  with  political 
advantages. However, the State Department stayed aloof 
from the free-trade area negotiations and proved reluctant 
to mediate when they came to a halt in  November 1958. 
The  many  US  commitments  abroad  were  beginning  to 
strain the  US  balance-of-payments, giving trade an  im-
portance which it had  not had  in  the  past as  a  policy 
element.  Henceforth, economic and  monetary considera-
tions would play a growing role in US-Community relations. 
The Creation of EFTA 
The alternative to the free trade area was the European 
Free  Trade Association of the  "Outer Seven,"  set  up  in 
1960 with Britain as  its most important member.  In  the 
British attempt to "build bridges"  between EFT A and  the 
EEC, the United States supported the EEC  Commission's 
view that close trade ties between  EFTA and  the  EEC, 
without corresponding commitments by the Seven to other 
Community policies, was a case of having one's cake and 
eating it. 
John F.  Kennedy's accession to the US  Presidency in 
January, 1961  marked the beginning of even  closer US 
relations with the  EEC  Commission, headed  by  Walter 
Hallstein. 
Kennedy's Grand Design 
American excitement over Europe's search for unity found 
its fullest expression in President Kennedy's Grand Design 
for an Atlantic Partnership between the new Europe and 
the United States. The President thus summed up the mood 
of the times: "We do not regard a strong and united Europe 
as a rival but a partner ... capable of playing a greater role 
in the common defense, of responding more generously 
to the needs of poorer nations, of joining with the United 
States and others in  lowering trade barriers, resolving 
problems of commerce and  commodities and  currency, 
and developing coordinated policies in all economic and 
diplomatic areas .... 
"The United States will be ready for a declaration of 
interdependence .... We will be  prepared to discuss with 
a united Europe the ways and means of forming an  Atlantic 
partnership ... between the new union emerging in Europe 
and the old American union founded here 175 years ago." 
Kennedy's  "thousand  days"  spanned  the  period  of 
Britain's first .attempt to  join the  Community which  the 
Administration strongly favored. It also tried to boost world 
trade by an  all-around reduction of tariffs. The Trade Ex-
pansion Act, based on the assumption that Britain would 
soon  be  a  member of  the  Community,  was  approved 
by Congress in 1962. Clearly, trade had become an  essen-
tial element in  relations between the two continents. " We 
must either trade or fade,"  declared  Kennedy. The act 
was the practical expression of Kennedy's "Grand Design," 
and useful progress was made in the Kennedy Round tariff 
negotiations. But the collapse of Britain's first entry appli-
cation in January 1963, the retirement of Konrad Adenauer, 
the resignation of Harold Macmillan, the assassination of 
Kennedy, and the low state of morale in  the Community 
after the French veto cast a deep shadow over the pros-
pects for the Atlantic Partnership.  11 The Political Winds Shift 
Among the main recent factors which have altered US-
European relations is the Vietnam war. It made Europe rela-
tively less important for Washington. The war helped to 
aggravate the US  balance of payments deficit. A conse-
quence of that deficit was the increasing quantities of Eu-
rodollars" which enabled US companies to expand their 
European subsidiaries and buy out old-established Euro-
pean firms. Europeans gradually became alarmed at the 
"technological gap" between the United States and them-
selves. 
Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiber's best-seller The Ameri-
can Challenge, while not anti-American in tone, suggested 
that the European nations would be even more dwarfed by 
the United States unless they made a joint effort to promote 
their industrial development. Prime Minister Harold L. Wil-
son in Strasbourg told fellow Europeans that only by in-
creasing economic integration could they avoid the risk of 
becoming "helots" of the United States. While Americans 
criticized what they considered to be protectionist and dis-
criminatory aspects of Community policies,  Europeans 
complained about the failure of the United States to imple-
ment its Kennedy Round undertakings to repeal the Ameri-
can Selling Price system of assessing customs duties on 
certain chemicals. In isolation, France attacked the non-
Communist world's dependence on the dollar as the reserve 
currency. There was also anxiety at the sustained pressure 
for protectionist legislation. Europe and Asia were relieved 
Hamburg harbor. Ports such as  this have their huge volume of exports threatened 
by the new US  Economic Policy.  PHOTO: Courtesy German Information Center, 
New York. 
when the Mills Bill failed to get through Congress last year. 
Even  at the highest political level, there were official 
warning signals that Washington was revising its traditional 
foreign policies. At Guam, President Nixon announced that 
while the United States would help to defend and develop 
its allies, it would not "conceive all the plans, design all the 
programs and undertake all the defense." The United States 
would help where it was considered to be "in our interest." 
Over the months, the President called for a sharing of re-
sponsibilities. At the same time, he sensed the changed 
mood  in  Europe; for too long, the United States has led 
without listening, he admitted. 
From the start, the Nixon Administration sought new ways 
to help US industries, firms and workers to adjust to compe-
tition from exports, and authority to retaliate against other 
countries, if their trading practices were thought to impinge 
unfairly on US exports in world markets. 
Mr.  Nixon saw his task as  leading the  United States 
through a transition in  foreign policy, from the era of US 
predominance to one where partnership was "physically 
and psychologically imperative." He and his advisers were 
presumably influenced by the  increasingly independent 
diplomatic line taken by France and Germany, and Prime 
Minister Edward Heath's intention that British  interests 
should determine British policies. 
Mr. Nixon, on  February 25,  1971,  reaffirmed support for 
European unity, but with a significant qualification. "For 
years  it was  believed  uncritically that  a  unified  Western 
Europe would automatically lift burdens from the shoulders 
of the United States. The truth is not so  simple. European 
unity will also pose problems for American policy, which 
it would be idle to ignore. 
"For our closest friends are now developing a collective 
identity and collective policies separate from us. And unity 
happens to be coming fastest in the economic sphere-the 
area of policy in which competition seems to have the least 
immediate penalty and our common interest will take the 
most effort to insure. Each of us maintains restrictions on 
agricultural trade which limit the export opportunities of the 
other. America's main restrictions are on dairy products; 
the  European  Community's common  agricultural  policy 
restrains our exports of grains. The Community's preferen-
tial trading arrangements with Mediterranean countries are 
a problem for American citrus exports. 
"The common interest requires the prosperity of both. 
This means freer and expanded trade and restraint in pro-
tecting special interests. We must negotiate a reduction in 
our trade restrictions. We must work toward a more equita-
ble worldwide trading system which is based upon most-
favored-nation treatment among all industrial nations and 
in which all of them accord the same tariff preferences to 
the entire developing world." 
In the spring of 1971, the Community unilaterally made 
trade concessions on US citrus exports, but it became clear 
that the United States regarded these as  inadequate, and 
the issue  remains unsettled.  Nevertheless,  both  the  Com-
munity and the United States agree on the need to travel 
from dependence to partnership. Both appreciate that it is 
not any easy road. US-EC Relations: View From Abroad 
H. PETER DREYER 
The shock therapy administered by President Richard M. 
Nixon on August 15 may or may not have ushered in a new 
era in  US relations with Western Europe. Time alone will 
tell, but  t~.e announcement of the new economic policy 
immediately heightened the awareness on both sides of the 
Atlantic of some deep-seated tensions between the United 
States and the European Community. 
These tensions originated years ago but have been ig-
nored by some people and only dimly perceived by others. 
Admittedly, the notorious 1963 "chicken war" looks trifling 
in retrospect. No longer is the public's blood pressure apt 
to rise much over the "peaks and valleys" tariff structure 
controversy that took up so  much time  in  the  Kennedy 
Round  of negotiations within the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade. Countless other complaints and counter-
complaints neither reached nor were comprehensible to 
more than a handful of officials, yet they occurred all along. 
This is  no revelation. There is  probably only one way of 
eliminating all friction and  causes of friction between two 
trading units as huge as the United States and the Common 
Market: it is to stop them from doing any business at all 
with each other. 
A Stretching Grievance List 
Lately the situation has moved well beyond the unavoid-
able irritation level. It frankly was bad for some time before 
mid-August, but the problems seem to have become more 
serious. For a long time, these difficulties have not been 
limited to trade issues, important as they are. The area of 
conflict, actual and potential, overt and tacit, has expanded 
steadily and incisively. 
At this point the US  grievances and  disappointments, 
both  real  and  imagined could simply be listed. However, 
this  approach  would  be  one-sided,  pallid,  and  unsatis-
factory for an  observer who has  witnessed  events from 
Europe. There is one overriding aspect, after all. All along, 
the  United  States  and  the  Community  have  not  been 
operating each in  a watertight compartment of their own. 
Action and  reaction  have alternated  and  intermingled. 
A little episode might illustrate this point. In  late 1967 
after the grueling Kennedy Round of GATT negotiations 
had ended, I met in Washington with Ambassador William 
M. Roth, US Chief Negotiator who had remained in office 
as the President's Special Trade Representative. Involved 
at that moment in beating back a barrage of protectionist 
motions in  the Congress, this seasoned negotiator looked 
haggard. One of his chief worries, Common Market "export 
subsidies" on  Italian canned tomatoes and tomato paste, 
had provided first rate ammunition for his Congressional 
opponents. They pounced on  the issue as  proof of the 
Community's nefarious designs and full justification of their 
own desires for protection in  numerous areas totally un-
related to tomatoes. 
Walling-Off Urge Persists 
To speak of an international protectionist conspiracy would 
Mr. Dreyer writes on Community affairs for The Journal of Com-
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perhaps be an exaggeration. Still, the urge to wall off less 
efficient domestic operations from tough foreign competi-
tion has survived almost everywhere in  one form or an-
other. Protectionist lobbies reinforce each other's efforts, 
however unwittingly, and usually can produce plausible and 
politically expedient arguments in defense of their attitude. 
In algebra, two minuses make a plus. In trade, they do not. 
The situation brings to mind some mediocre drivers who 
constantly criticize every other road user's mistakes (pos-
sibly quite  real)  but  who  consider themselves  perfect 
motorists. 
This frame of mind enabled US legislators, presumably 
supported by large segments of the public, at one and the 
same time to push the virulently protectionist "Mills Bill", 
and  with  equal  fervor to  rail  against  the  Community's 
"outrageous" common agricultural policy (CAP). 
This dichotomy has been an  irritant. Both sides trot out 
endless trade statistics to prove or deny the CAP's adverse 
impact. This seems a somewhat futile exercise, consider-
ing that the Community's farm imports must, and do, vary 
substantially year after year depending on  crop conditions. 
Nevertheless the CAP does contain a sizeable protectionist 
component, and it has, on the average, damaged American 
produce exports both to the Common Market and to third 
country markets. 
New "Bates Noires" 
The CAP, favorite old "bete noire" of European integration, 
has had company in the past couple of years. Loudly, in-
cessantly, but so far futilely, Washington has objected to 
the series of preferential accords which the Community 
has either signed or is negotiating with countries around 
the Mediterranean. The US considers these agreements in 
violation of GATT rules. 
In view of the extensive and costly US defense commit-
ments in the Mediterranean, the Community's justification 
of its policy as a contribution to the region's threatened 
stability has fallen on  deaf ears. The United States may 
once have been willing to accept one or a few agreements, 
but it now sees a direct threat to individual trade interests 
and senses a potentially greater danger in this multiplica-
tion of Community trade agreements with other countries. 
After  Brussels  completes  negotiations  with  Britain, 
Ireland, Denmark, and Norway for Community membership 
and with non-candidate members of the European  Free 
Trade Association, the United States will face a huge bloc 
of nations stretching from the North Cape of Norway to 
the northern border of South Africa, held together by a 
large variety of agreements. Irrespective of whether these 
agreements comply with international accords and  regard-
less  of their possible political implications, they discrimi-
nate against all outsiders. 
Perhaps none of these developments would be upsetting 
had  not the  threads  of many-hued  emotional  attitudes, 
woven conspicuously into the fabric of American-European 
relations, tended to  mar rather than embellish the picture 
in recent years. Here again, cause and effect, moods and 
impulses intermingle so powerfully that neither side's atti-
tudes can properly be appraised and judged separately.  13 14 
The  port of Bordeaux. European countries do not expect the US  import surcharge 
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Growing U.S. Dischantment 
Nevertheless, the basic trouble, as far as Americans are 
concerned,  is  growing disenchantment.  In  the Common 
Market's early days,  many Americans cherished  a vision 
(however unrealistic) of a United States of Europe, modeled 
on  their own  United States. This dream  is  still far from 
being fulfilled and may never be. Disappointment has been 
fed by the material clashes mentioned earlier and by the 
mounting suspicion that the Community might be inward-
looking and protectionist. But mainly the public (and not 
just on the US shore of the Atlantic) has been dismayed at 
the emergence of a complicated administrative machinery 
and at the internal debate, both almost entirely beyond its 
comprehension. The  ardently hoped  for political  gains 
seem few and far between. 
Long before the Nixon declaration, Americans were con-
stantly being asked by European friends whether the US 
view of European integration, once so  encouraging and 
favorable,  had  changed. Officially, of course,  it has  not. 
But these eternal "Do you still love us" questions over-
looked two things: 
•  Indifference to  integration developed no faster in  the 
United States than  it did within most Community nations. 
•  Year after year, it became painfully evident that, if by a 
miracle such "love" had weathered all disillusionment, it 
would decidely have been a one-way affair. 
Mote in Europe's Eye Too 
On the European side for quite some time now, the feeling 
that the United States could do almost nothing right fre-
quently has turned up in  private conversations but not in 
official utterances. This is not the place to differentiate 
valid from spurious reasons behind the ever-lasting criti-
cism, or to decide how much of it is due to events like the 
Vietnam war, or to subtle (and unsubtle) propaganda from 
sources both East and West, or to psychological revulsion 
from  the  immediate  post-war  years  when  all  Western 
Europe lay at  the feet of the  United States and  did not 
seem to mind. For whatever reason, the fact remains that 
Europe's reaction to many US moves, including those in the 
economic sphere, has often been a case of "damned if 
you do and damned if you don't." The rapid growth of US 
corporate investments in  Europe has made many Euro-
peans unhappy, but so too did Washington's measure to 
curtail them. For years, the United States was lectured on 
the evils of its easy money policy, but when it was replaced 
by tight and expensive credit, Europeans were seriously 
and vocally shocked by the impact on their own economies, 
just as they were once again when  money policies were 
later reversed. 
This shift in  European  opinion  has  escaped  neither 
leaders nor the public. Being as ready as anyone else to 
behold the mote in  their brothers' eyes  rather than the 
beam in their own, Americans may have judged the Com-
munity's plan  for full  economic and  political  union  pri-
marily as a European effort to become independent of the 
dollar, and the introduction of the Community's tax on  the 
value-added (TVA) as a means of discriminating against 
US exports. 
Awareness But No Easy Solution 
Such impressions have added up to the feeling that Western 
Europe,  having  gained  unprecedented  prosperity with 
American help, is indifferent to US economic difficulties and 
to sharing the political and military burdens. 
The  Nixon declaration brought this mood sharply into 
focus and made everyone conscious of the existing ten-
sions. Yet they have dragged on  for quite some time. Euro-
peans are as  vexed with Americans and  vice-versa. The 
Nixon message has added fuel to the flames, and there is 
no easy way out. 
Nothing will be gained by minimizing or ridiculing real or 
imagined problems, as has been done in the past. Any hope 
of settlement lies in the fact that the conflict is between 
countries which are allies and which, in the final analysis, 
have basic interests in common. However, this communality 
neither guarantees a quick solution  nor  promises  that 
matters will not turn worse before they become better. Where the US Measures Could Hurt 
ROBERT TAYLOR 
President Richard M. Nixon's August 15 package to defend 
the dollar makes it more difficult to sell European Com-
munity goods in the United States. It has sharpened compe-
tition in other markets between the Six and non-member 
countries, and among EC member states themselves. 
Not all member states are affected to the same extent by 
Washington's measures. Germany and Italy each sell about 
10 per cent of their exports to the United States and are, 
therefore, more seriously affected than France and the 
Benelux countries, for which the American market repre-
sents between 5 per cent and 6 per cent of their total 
exports. 
Germany: Cars, Chemicals, Machinery 
The United States buys 10 per cent of Germany's exports, 
and 90 per cent of these sales will be subject to the import 
surcharge, without counting the impact of the proposed tax 
concessions to US firms. The hardest hit sectors are engi-
neering products, cars, optical instruments, and chemicals. 
For them  the American restrictions come at a bad moment 
and will f~rther depress their earnings. The German car 
industry expects its earnings to fall by 25 per cent this year, 
despite higher turnover. For the chemical industry, although 
sales have gone up by 5 per cent, earnings will drop by an 
estimated 20  per cent. 
German industry is confident that specialized products 
for which it has carved out a market in the United States 
will continue to sell there, despite the new barriers. The 
situation in other markets is more worrisome, because the 
mark is already floating higher than any of the currencies 
of Germany's main competitors (Japan, Britain, Italy, and 
France). 
France: Impact Cushioned 
France is not unaffected by the American package, but the 
impact is likely to be less than for other member states. 
France does a comparatively small proportion (5.3 per cent) 
of its total trade with the United States, and because the 
franc remains tied to the dollar for commercial transactions, 
the price of its goods has not changed in other markets. 
By contrast, prices have increased for exports from coun-
tries whose currencies have floated upwards from their 
official parities. 
Nevertheless, France should begin to feel the pinch early 
next year. Each $10,000 drop in US imports will mean a 
direct loss of $340 for French exporters. As an indirect re-
sult of the Nixon program, France will probably find it 
harder to sell elsewhere, especially in Germany, which now 
takes 20  per cent of French exports. 
Italy: Capital Goods, Footwear, Textiles 
The United States is Italy's third biggest customer after 
Germany and France. About 70 per cent of Italian products 
sold in the United States will bear the full brunt of the 10 per 
cent surcharge, while about 20 per cent will be taxed at 
rates of from 5 per cent to 8 per cent. The rest will enter 
without being subject to the new restriction. The principal 
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Hyacinths near Usse. In the Netherlands so tar, the bulb exporters seem to be 
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Italian exports are capital goods and machinery, footwear, 
textiles, motor vehicles and spare parts. Overall, the sur-
charge is expected to raise export prices by 8 per cent, 
calculated at the 1970 level. 
The Italian engineering industry will be particularly hard 
hit if the planned tax rebates are granted to American firms 
for purchases of local goods. Italian industrialists also fear 
that German and Japanese exporters will turn more and 
more to other markets for outlets, leading to an inevitable 
sharpening of competition. For Italy, the August 15 bomb-
shell came when the economy was already softening, and 
the effects could be greater than statistics would suggest. 
The Netherlands: Flower Bulbs, Canned Meat 
The Netherlands fears indirect consequences of the US 
measures more than their immediate effect on Dutch sales 
to the United States. The main exports to the US market are 
flower bulbs and canned meat; so far, bulb exporters seem 
to be the only people to have suffered from the surcharge. 
On the other hand, the Dutch expect Japan and other Far 
Eastern countries such as Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singa-
pore to step up their efforts to sell in Europe. If so, Dutch 
manufacturers of electronic equipment, precision instru-
ments, and textiles could find it harder to boost exports. 
Belgium and Luxembourg: Steel Construction 
For Belgium, too, the indirect effects are the most important 
considerations. The country exports three-quarters of its 
production, much of it as material for manufacturing indus-
tries in other countries. If these industries abroad are hit 
by US protectionism, Belgian exports will suffer. In addi-
tion, countries unable to sell to America are likely to turn 
more and more to traditional European markets and inten-
sify their sales campaigns in  Belgium. 
As for the direct consequences, the restrictions will fall 
hardest on the steel industry in Belgium, but especially in 
Luxembourg whose economy is heavily dependent on steel 
exports. Like Germany, both countries hope that special-
ized products which have made a name for themselves in 
the United States and are not easily replaced will go on 
selling there,  despite the  surcharge.  15 Confrontation or Cooperation? 
UGO  PICCIONE 
The United States and the European Communities may be 
on a collision course leading to a major trade war, with dire 
consequences for world  incomes,  employment and  eco-
nomic growth. This pessimistic conclusion seems justified 
by the wide differences that, despite last month's meetings 
in London and Washington, still divide the United States 
and Europe on solving the dollar crisis stemming from the 
chronic US  balance-of-payments deficit. 
The crisis was brought to a head in mid-August when, 
unilaterally discarding the International Monetary Fund and 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade rules, President 
Richard M. Nixon decided to: 
•  abrogate the 22-year-old US pledge to exchange dollars 
for gold 
•  introduce a series of protectionist measures including a 
10 per cent import surcharge, a 10 per cent tax credit for 
investments in US-made equipment, and substantial subsi-
dies (in the form of tax exemption to certain American 
exporters). 
Mr. Nixon's decision to sever the dollar-gold umbilical 
cord and suspend conversion of foreign-held dollars into 
gold was designed to force Europe and Japan to revalue 
their currencies against the dollar-a move that would both 
curtail European and Japanese exports to the United States 
and boost American sales abroad. To make its ultimatum for 
foreign revaluations even clearer, Washington announced 
that the 10 per cent import surtax would be removed only 
after a "substantial and fundamental" improvement in the 
US balance of payments, and provided that other industrial 
countries agree both to remove alleged trade barriers 
against American products and pick up a larger share of 
the Western world's defense burden. 
The key objective of the Nixon administration is to elimi-
nate the United States' huge and  persistent balance of 
payments  deficit which, Washington  contends,  is  mainly 
due to the "unfair"  economic, commercial and monetary 
policies of its  major trading  partners. 
In fact, analysis of the US balance of payments reveals 
that the chronic deficits result from large government ex-
penditures abroad (military and foreign aid), and overseas 
investment by American companies. In the last 22 years of 
overall deficit (since 1949, with the exception of 1957 and 
1968), the US trade balance has always shown a comfort-
able surplus. In 1965-70, the US trade surplus averaged 
$2.7 billion a year, as compared with a $6.8 billion average 
annual deficit for government expenditures abroad and 
$3.2 billion average annual outflow for US corporate invest-
ments. 
Conveniently ignoring these factors, US Treasury Secre-
tary John M. Connally, at the September 15 London meeting 
of the "Group of Ten," demanded that other countries pro-
ceed to a sharp revaluation and everything else necessary 
to enable the United States to achieve, by next year, a $13 
billion turnabout-from a projected $5 billion deficit to an 
$8 billion surplus-in its basic balance of payments (trade, 
services, and all other transactions except short-term capi-
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tal flows). As for the United States, Mr. Connally was ada-
mant: Washington would never agree to devaluate the 
dollar in terms of gold. 
Undue Emphasis on Trade 
While ready to help the United States to improve its external 
account, EC countries, Japan and the other members of the 
"Group" disagreed with Washington on the method: pre-
senting a united front against the United States, they called 
for devaluation of the dolla.r, a gradual reduction of the 
reserve role of the US currency, and the removal of the 10 
per cent import tax as a precondition for a realignment 
of their currencies. 
According to this rationale, though US authorities alone 
bear direct responsibility for their country's balance-of-
payments position, the "beggar-my-neighbor'' strategy of 
Mr. Nixon would shift onto the rest of the world (including 
the less-developed countries) the economic burden of re-
adjustment that the United States should shoulder itself. 
Indeed, a $13  billion  improvement in  the  US  external 
position could be achieved, in the short period of one year, 
only at the price of recession in other countries. As envis-
aged by Washington, the "turnabout" should be accom-
plished exclusively through a massive surplus in the US 
trade balance, without any restraint on US government 
expenditures abroad or private direct investments overseas. 
It is hard to see how the United States could expect strong-
currencies alone to suffer the disruptive economic effects 
of monetary adjustments. Recognizing that 19 years of 
deficits have weakened the dollar, Washington wants its 
currency to be devaluated enough to get a strong balance-
of-payments position.  Just as  other countries agree to 
revalue, the United States should be willing to devalue the 
dollar against gold. 
For EC countries, an eventual revaluation raises consid-
erable problems: their exports would become less competi-
tive not only in the United States but throughout the world. 
Textile plant in  Milan.  Europe views  with alarm the proliferation  of "voluntary" 
restraints on  US  imports,  such  as  textiles and steel. PHOTO:  Courtesy Italian 
Government Travel  Office, New York The situation is further complicated by the aggregate im-
pact of the US protectionist "package" (i.e., the import 
surtax, the 10 per cent investment tax credit, the export 
subsidies) which will keep many European industries out 
of the US market while exposing them to unfair US compe-
tition both  in  their own  and  in  third country markets. 
According to a study prepared by the EC Commission 
(see European Community No. 148, page 12), the import 
surcharge effectively doubles the average level of American 
duties (already higher than the European Communities' 
common external tariff), thus nullifying the duty conces-
sions negotiated at the Dillon Round (1962) and the Ken-
nedy Round (1967). The surtax raises US tariffs on industrial 
products to an arithmetic average of 19.5 per cent, as com-
pared to the EC's average of 6.9 per cent. Nearly 87 per 
cent of EC exports to the United States are affected by 
the surtax, with the greater impact to be felt by automobiles, 
chemicals, machinery, textiles, shoes, steel, and foodstuffs. 
Coupled with the surtax and the "de facto" revaluation 
of most European currencies, the 10 per cent tax credit on 
investments in US-made equipment is expected to increase 
by up to four times the degree of protection already en-
joyed by US producers of capital goods, thus practically 
barring from the American market European-made machin-
ery and equipment. Finally, the proposed direct tax exemp-
tion to certain US companies (the so-called Domestic Inter-
national Sales Corporations-any firm deriving 95 per cent 
or more of its gross profits from export activities) would 
provide US industry with a major export subsidy that would 
give American products a considerable price advantage 
on all international markets, considering that the US cor-
porate tax rate is currently 58.4 per cent. 
The US "package" will deepen the EC's aggregate trade 
deficit by an additional $2 billion per year: other short-term 
consequences are a much lower growth rate of the EC's 
external trade (from 8 per cent to 4 per cent a year), re-
duced employment and industrial competitiveness. 
EC: Fastest Growing US Market 
The "package," which runs afoul of international GATT 
rules, was justified by the US President as necessary to 
"create jobs in the United States," provide "the strongest 
incentive to investments in US-made machinery and equip-
ment," and "make sure that American products will not be 
at a disadvantage because of unfair exchange rates." US 
trading partners are being asked to confront all the eco-
nomic, social, and political problems that Mr. Nixon's "new 
deal" seeks to eliminate from the US economic scene. 
From the EC standpoint, this approach is objectionable, 
since the profound structural modifications caused by the 
inception of the Common Market have had no major ad-
verse consequences for the rest of the world in general and 
the United States in particular. 
The European Communities, indeed, has been the most 
rapidly growing market in the world for the United States: 
total American trade with the European Communities now 
exceeds $16 billion, over three times the 1958 level. In the 
last 12 years, US exports to the Common Market rose 215 
per cent, while US sales to the countries in  the European 
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Free Trade Association increased by only 146 per cent 
and to the rest of the world by 167 per cent. In  1970, 
American exports to the EC climbed 21  per cent to $9.04 
billion, compared to an  11  per cent increase in  US sales 
to both EFT A and the rest of the world. Since 1958, the 
United States has constantly registered a large trade sur-
plus-averaging $2 billion annually-with the Common 
Market; last year, the EC trade deficit with the United States 
stood at a sizable $2.4 billion. 
US Companies Expand in EC 
The analysis of US-EC trading relations would be incom-
plete without mentioning how widely American exports to 
the Common Market have been replaced by EC-based 
manufacturing plants of US companies, due to the high 
differential between US and European production costs. 
This phenomenon explains both the moderate downward 
trend in the growth of US exports to the EC and the rela-
tively faster increase of EC sales to the US. Last year, the 
"book" value of US direct investments in the EC-which to 
a very large extent are financed by European capital-was 
$13 billion, up 27 per cent over 1969 and a six-fold increase 
over the 19591evel. EC subsidiaries of US companies are 
estimated to account for about 16 per cent of all new indus-
trial investments in the Common Market: in 1968, their sales 
rose to $14 billion, 2.5 times the aggregate value of direct 
US exports to the European Communities. The fast growth 
in the number of these "EC insiders" contributes to the 
steady erosion of American exports to Europe and the 
growth of US imports; conversely, through the repatriation 
of dividends, interest and royalties, these investments con-
tribute significantly to reduce the size of the US balance-of-
payments deficits: last year, dividend remittances by EC  17 18 
subsidiaries of American firms were $1  billion. 
For all these reasons, it is hard to see how the European 
Communities can be blamed for the US economic and 
monetary difficulties which, as admitted by Under Secretary 
of State Nathaniel Samuels, are due to the fact that "US 
costs of production have risen sharply over the years, pro-
ductivity gains have not been as large as required, and 
protracted unemployment and inflation, side by side, have 
bedeviled us." 
The special international role of the dollar has enabled 
Washington to postpone the economic readjustments which 
its chronic balance-of-payments deficits would have other-
wise forced upon the United States: this has led to an over-
valuation of the dollar which, in turn, is one of the prime 
causes of the relative deterioration of the US balance of 
trade. It is highly questionable whether the Nixon "pack-
age" will provide an adequate solution to these problems. 
European experiences have repeatedly proven that a de-
valuation, no matter how it is achieved, succeeds only if 
accompanied by severe and lasting austerity measures and 
provided that domestic industry is not shielded from foreign 
competition. This is not the course followed by the US 
Administration. 
Domestic political considerations seem to have prevailed 
upon basic economic theories and led to measures that 
underscore the return by the United States to a nee-mer-
cantilist approach to international trade. The resurgence of 
protectionism in the United States is basically due to the 
largely unjustified belief that other countries have not gone 
as far in the direction of free trade as has the United States. 
For the Americans, it is not the United States that is at fault 
but all other countries, notably the Six, whose restrictive 
trade policies deny a fair competitive treatment to US 
products. 
Disregarding its constant surplus on trade with the Com-
munity, Washington maintains that US exports have been 
harmed by the Common Market's farm policy, the EC's 
preferential agreements with African, Mediterranean, and 
other European countries, and a series of non-tariff trade 
barriers (i.e., the tax on the value-added (TVA), public pro-
curement rules). 
From Europe's vantage point, the claim that the United 
States is the most "open" market in the world is hard to 
substantiate. More than 20 per cent of all US imports are 
subject to voluntary or mandatory quotas (i.e., steel, cotton 
textiles, wool, petroleum, sugar, meat, wheat, dairy prod-
ucts, wool, ceramic tiles); as for non-tariff trade barriers, 
the US market is hedged with a formidable ring of such 
devices as the Buy American Act, the American Selling 
Price, the Fair Labor Act, and the countervailing duty 
statute. 
A Different World 
Complaints can be listed on both sides of the Atlantic; the 
real question is whether the United States is ready to recog-
nize that the world has changed considerably since the end 
of World War II. Today, the United States no longer domi-
nates the international economic scene; in the last 10 years, 
the economies of EC countries and Japan have grown faster 
than the US economy and made substantial progress in 
technology and production efficiency. American firms, par-
ticularly those operating in labor-intensive industries, are 
now doing business in a new international environment 
in which they face stronger foreign competitors. It would 
be dangerous for the United States and the whole world 
for Washington to assume that it can modify this situation 
and restrict foreign imports without feeling adverse effects 
on its exports; a US move towards protectionism would 
find a worldwide response in the same direction. 
Today, power relationships are in a continuous state of 
mobility. "The game has changed," The New York Times 
has written. "Allies as well as adversaries will be speaking 
more boldly and more bluntly, whether the United States 
likes it or not. The United States cannot compete more in-
tensively with stronger allies and still receive quite the same 
deference it once enjoyed. It will have to convince more 
than it can command." 
Recent events seem to indicate that the United States 
is unwilling to acknowledge these truths, and wants to go 
its own  way,  regardless of whether or not it hurts the 
interests of other countries. For, despite Mr. Nixon's rhe-
torical statements to the effect that "the United States has 
always been, and will continue to be, a forward-looking 
and trust-worthy trading partner" or that "the interest of 
the  United States and  of the whole world will be  best 
served by moving towards freer trade," one truth is self-
evident: the US "new look" is nationalistic, endangers 
multilateral trading rules, and opens the door to the threat 
of a worldwide trade war. 
Washington does not realize that Europe today is not the 
same Europe of 25 years ago, and that America too has 
changed. Europeans are no longer willing to accommodate 
themselves to the political obligations or to the campaign 
promises of a US president, and still less so to the economic 
privileges that America claims in international trade. 
So far, the EC, although authorized by Article XXIII of 
GATT, has refrained from taking retaliatory steps. How-
ever, pressure for retaliation will be too hard to resist if the 
United States does not withdraw its new trade restrictions: 
like its Canadian counterpart, European industry will press 
for the swift adoption of countermeasures such as export 
subsidies, import surcharges, limitations on  US direct in-
vestments. Inevitably, this would lead to an escalation of 
economic nationalism and protectionism, and eventually 
to a serious crisis in  EC-US relations. 
Recent history has shown how interdependent the econ-
omies of the Western world have become, a truism which 
was emphatically underlined when the slow growth of world 
trade contributed to the devaluation of the British pound 
in 1967, and when the recession in West Germany had 
repercussions throughout Europe. 
It is thus difficult to see how the long-term economic and 
political interests of the United States will be aided by pro-
tectionism. Certainly, the United States has to do something 
to reduce its balance-of-payments deficit, but, on the inter-
national trading level, this can be best done in cooperation 
with their major trading partners, rather than in isolation. 
Protectionism would, in  the end, be self-defeating. Recent Books 
European Community periodically lists 
books dealing with Community and Atlantic 
topics. Prices are also given, whenever 
known. This presentation does not indicate 
approval or recommendation of these pub-
lications which can be purchased or or-
dered from most booksellers  .. . 
L'idee europeenne. By Edouard Gruter. Ar-
mand Colin, Paris, 1971. 96 pages with 
bibliography. 
One of the "dossier sciences humaines" 
series, this little book is a collection of docu-
ments pertaining to the development of a 
European community over the last three cen-
turies. 
Beginning  with  a  proposed  European 
peace plan written by a French abbe in 1713, 
the editor has selected documents fitting in-
to three broad time spans: from the seven-
teenth century through 1850; the pre-World 
War I period through World War II and Euro-
pean Reconstruction; and finally, the present 
period which began with Jean Monnet's and 
Robert Schuman's plan in 1950 for the Coal 
and Steel Community. The first period, the 
author maintains, was one of general agree-
ment on the existence of a common, superi-
or civilization by a group of separate states 
whose political entente was, however, of a 
transient nature. The early political "Euro-
peans" were dreamers (and poets, such as 
Victor Hugo) fighting against the strong na-
tionalisms which arose  in  the nineteenth 
century. Even before the political decline of 
Europe to a "peninsula of Eurasia," there-
sult of World War I,  the idea of a "Europe" 
was relegated to the background and there 
remained until after World War II. The last 
period, in which the European Economic 
Community came  into being, was one of 
probing of the relations of various nations to 
the Community, both internal and external, 
and of the possible changes not only in size 
but also in kind of the European economic 
structure. 
Germany in Our Time: A Political History of 
the Postwar Years. By Alfred Grosser. Prae-
ger Publishers, New York, 1971. 378 pages, 
with index and critical bibliography. $12.50. 
A  detailed political  history of Germany 
since 1945, which Grosser sees as a critical 
turning point, the book traces the continuity 
in German society from before World War II, 
treating first occupied Germany, then the 
nations emerging from  it.  It is Grosser's 
thesis that, because of past and present pol-
icy on the part of the Allies as well as the 
Germans, the two Germanies in their respec-
tive supra national spheres will remain sepa-
rate for a long time to come. The decisions 
of 25 years and the emergence of a new 
generation on either side of the Iron Curtain 
have produced loyalties to their "sector" as 
well as to "the German nation," a concept 
which should not be stifled if Germany, or 
the Germanies, is to become a secure 
modern nation. 
La  Cooperation lnternationale dans les In-
dustries Aeronautiques Europeenes. By 
Gerard Joucla. Librairie de Droit et de Juris-
prudence, Paris, 1971. 191  pages with bib-
liography and appendices. 
Sixth of a series on international cooper-
ation and law, the book is a study of suc-
cesses and failures of economic and inter-
governmental cooperation in the aeronau-
tics industry. 
The book deals specifically with the legal 
aspects of enterprise and governmental 
agreements  for cooperation and interna-
tional sub-contracting and discusses some 
of the programs undertaken such as the 
Concorde, the Transall, and Jaguar planes. 
The author stresses the need for increased 
European cooperation in the field to meet 
the American challenge and to stop the de-
cline of the European industry. He suggests 
the need for a simplified legal system and 
rational multinational means of production 
and research for the manufacture of com-
petitive machinery. 
Civil Nuclear Power and International Se-
curity. Edited by Mason Will rich. Praeger 
Publishers, New York, 1971. 95 pages with 
appendices. $10. 
An assessment of international security 
problems arising from the dispersion of fis-
sionable materials and technology to civil-
ian sources in the 1970's and beyond. 
It is argued that nuclear technology used 
to generate electricity can easily be used to 
produce nuclear weapons. On the premise 
that the implications of this problem have 
neither been adequately recognized nor 
dealt with, the book tries to point out the 
military potential of civil nuclear industries 
and flaws in international safeguard mecha-
nisms in their international political context. 
Food and the Law: A Symposium. Edited by 
Robin L. Joseph. Republic of Ireland Branch 
of the Institute of Food Science and Tech-
nology of the United Kingdom, Dublin, 1971. 
62  pages. 
A study of food technology, marketing 
techniques and the rules required for con-
sumer information and honest trading. 
Taking into account the revolutionary 
changes in food production that have oc-
curred in developed societies (large-scale 
compounding, processing, packaging and 
distribution of food), the book points out 
what is being done and why. It also shows 
the constant changes in the law and the de-
bate between affected interests that pre-
cedes new law. 
The Kennedy Round in American Trade 
Policy: The Twilight of the GATT? By John 
W.  Evans. Harvard University Press, 1971. 
327 pages plus selected bibliography, notes, 
index and appendix. $13.95. 
An  examination of post-Kennedy Round 
developments to determine whether they 
mark the culmination of the postwar system 
or the beginning of a new system that will 
change traditional negotiating techniques 
and objectives. 
The author uses the Kennedy Round of 
tariff negotiations in the 1960's as a focal 
point in his analysis of the postwar trading 
system. He first traces the development of 
the intricate system of multilateral trading 
agreements that preceded the Kennedy 
Round and goes on  to analyze the Round 
from the viewpoint of a participant. In addi-
tion, the author raises central questions 
concerning the nature and origins of the 
issues that the negotiations set out to re-
solve and the extent to which they suc-
ceeded. The trend toward regional integra-
tion, as  exemplified by the European 
Economic Community, is also evaluated. 
Migrants In Europe: Problems of Accept-
ance and Adjustment. By Arnold N. Rose. 
University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 
1969. 194 pages with appendices and index. 
$7.50. 
This monograph concentrates on what the 
author contends is the least developed level 
of integration-that of people. 
He approaches the topic by studying the 
cross-national migration of workers and 
their adjustment in countries of immigration. 
It is contended that, without increased inte-
gration of people, the effectiveness of states-
men's agreements will be limited, and if 
large scale rejection of such integration de-
velops, progress toward European unity will 
be nullified. 
The World's Economy: How it Works. By 
William M.  Clarke and George Pulay. Prae-
ger Publishers, New York, 1971. 208 pages 
plus index. $6.95. 
A guide to the way the international 
monetary system works today and how it 
might work in the future. Written primarily 
for people without basic knowledge of 
economics. 
The authors begin with basic financial 
frameworks and move on  to a study of 
more difficult monetary systems. Past finan-
cial structures are examined, and, pointing 
to the future, crucial issues such as mone-
tary crises and the role of gold are studied. 
The International Monetary Fund, the World 
Bank, the Eurodollar Market, urban mone-
tary operations and other aspects of the 
world economy are explained.  19 Publications  Available 
TABLEAUX ENTREES-SORTIES: SERlE 
SPECIALE. 
Statistical Office of the European Communi-
ties, Luxembourg, 1970, Complete Series of 
Six  volumes  .$14.00 
Also available individually, as follows: 
Vol. 1-METHODOLOGIE COMMUNAU-
TAIRE DES TABLEAUX ENTREES-SORTIES 
1  965, 222 pages  .  . $3.00 
Vol. 2-TABLEAU ENTREES-SORTIES 
ITALIE-1965, 151  pages  $3.00 
Vol. 3-TABLEAU ENTREES-SORTIES 
FRANCE-1965, 195 pages  ...  $3.00 
Vol. 4-TABLEAU ENTREES-SORTIES BEL-
GIQUE- 1965, 167 pages  .$3.00 
Vol. 5-TABLEAU ENTREES-SORTIES NED-
ERLAND-1965, 173 pages  ..  $3.00 
Vol 6-TABLEAU ENTREES-SORT! ES 
DEUTSCHLAND-1965  . . $3.00 
Each volume is in French plus the language 
of the country concerned. Detailed input-
output tables for the Community member 
states. All tables are preceded by a statisti-
cal analysis of resources and employment of 
goods and services. 
THE EFFECTS OF NATIONAL PRICE CON-
TROLS IN THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC 
COMMUNITY. Competition-Approximation 
of Legislation Series No.9, Commission of 
the European Communities, Brussels, 1970, 
168 pages  . .  $4.00 
An analysis of the impact of the Community 
members' national price control arrange-
ments in 1968. Includes an annex describing 
the systems of price controls and an exten-
sive bibliography. Evaluates the consistency 
of national price controls in te·rms  of the 
economic system of each member country 
and in terms of the economic system as con-
ceived by the Community. 
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OPINION SUBMITTED BY THE COMMISSION 
TO  THE  COUNCIL ON  THE  RELATIONS 
BETWEEN THE ENLARGED COMMUNITY 
AND THOSE EFTA MEMBER STATES (IN-
CLUDING THE ASSOCIATED FINLAND) 
WHICH HAVE NOT APPLIED FOR MEMBER-
SHIP OF THE COMMUNITY. Supplement No. 
3, 1971 , Annex to Bulletin of the European 
Communities No. 6 Commission of the Euro-
pean Communities, Brussels, June 16, 1971, 
15 pages  ... . ... . . $  .20 
Discusses the various problems and possible 
arrangements for the countries in the Euro-
pean Free Trade Association that have not 
applied for membership in the Community. 
Outlines the positions of Sweden, Switzer-
land, Austria, Finland, Ice/and, and Portugal. 
STATISTIQUES FISCALES 1965-1969. Sta-
tistical Office of the European Communities, 
Luxembourg, 1971,  111  pages  .....  $2.00 
French I German I Dutch! Italian text. Pro-
vides detailed data on the taxes collected 
in the member states of the Community, in-
cludes over 50 different types of tax. Con-
tains special tables for 1965 on industrial 
production and import tax revenue. 
A  REVIEW  OF  THE  COMMERCIAL AND 
MONETARY RELATIONS  BETWEEN THE 
UNITED STATES  AND  THE  EUROPEAN 
COMMUNITY. European Community Infor-
mation Service, Washington, D. C., October 
21 , 1971, 19 pages  ...  free 
Background paper containing a current re-
port by the Commission of the European 
Communities  on  issues  confronting  the 
United States and the Common Marke·t. 
TRAITES INSTITUANT LES COMMUNAUTES 
EUROPEENNES: TRAITES PORT  ANT REVI-
SIONS DE CES TRAITES ET DOCUMENTS 
ANNEXES. Office of Official Publications of 
the  European  Communities,  Luxembourg, 
1971 , 833  ..  $7.00 
Available in French, German, Dutch, or Ital-
ian.  Contains  the  Treaty establishing the 
European Coal and Steel Community, the 
Treaty establishing the European Economic 
Community, and the Treaty establishing the 
European Atomic Energy Community. It also 
contains every modification in those Treaties 
as of January 1, 1971, including the deci-
sions on the locations of some Community 
institutions and on the Community's own re-
sources. An English edition is in preparation. 
Teachlnu  Aids 
EUROPE'S CURRENCIES 1914 TO 1932. 
European Community Information Service, 
London, 1971, 5 pages .  . ..... . free 
Summary about the instability of the national 
currencies of a divided Europe after the first 
World War. 
THE TEXTILE INDUSTRY IN BRITAIN AND 
THE EEC. European Community Information 
Service, London, 1971 , 5 pages  .  . ..  free 
A brief history of the te·xtile industry and its 
future. Includes a Chart on the Production of 
some major textile goods from 1958-1968. 
THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, THE UNITED 
KINGDOM AND THE WORLD POPULATION 
TRENDS. European Community Information 
Service, London, 1971 , 4 pages.  . .  free 
Analyses methods of forecasting population 
and the results to which they lead. 